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U.K. REFUGEE LAWYERS: PUSHING THE
BOUNDARIES OF DOMESTIC COURT
ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
STEPHEN MEILI*

Abstract: This Article analyzes how refugee lawyers in the United Kingdom navigate the tension between state power and international norms.
Based on interviews with lawyers representing persons seeking asylum and
other forms of refugee protection in the United Kingdom, the Article reveals how these lawyers successfully utilize international human rights
treaties on )ehialf of their clients despite domestic policies making it more
difficult for refugees to assert their rights. The Article argues that U.K
refugee lawyers play a critical role in the globalization struggle by encouraging state actors (in this case, the judiciary) to adhere to international
norms that might otherwise go ignored in an anti-immigrant political
climate. In so doing, these lawyers have helped to broaden the sources on
which state power over imnigration is based. The Article thus contributes
to the literature on the devolution of state power in an era of globalization, as well as cause lawyering.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades, international law in many parts of the
world has been moving in a less state-centric direction and more toward
universal protection of human rights through, for example, the creation
of the International Criminal Court, the emergence of universal jurisdiction (e.g., the Pinochet case), and international ad hoc tribunals (e.g.,
for Rwanda and Yugoslavia). 1 At the same time, the world has witnessed

* Vaughan G. Papke Clinical Professor in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I
am indebted to the National Science Foundation and the Robina Foundation for funding
the research that resulted in this Article. I am also indebted to Gail Hupper for her
thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. Many thanks also to University of
Minnesota Law students Justin Erickson and Faiza Majeed for their excellent research assistance, as well as to Mary Rumsey of the University of Minnesota Law Library. Thanks
also to Margaret Benz and Jean Wells for transcribing interviews and other logistical tasks.
1 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, July 1, 2002, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90; R v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate (No. 3) (PinochetIII), [2000] 1
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the erosion of state sovereignty as the chief organizing principle of international relations. 2 Much as globalization of commerce has changed
the international marketplace, globalization of human rights law has
changed the way many countries treat non-citizens within their borders. 3
Asylum law vividly illustrates the way that globalization creates tension between state power and international norms. 4 On the one hand,
the global migration of people seeking relief from persecution hasthrough international treaties like the 1951 Convention relating to the
Status of Refuigees 5-created international legal norms that supplant
state power to decide who shall remain within a country and who shall
be removed or excluded. 6 On the other hand, states have continually
attempted to reassert power over their borders by enacting stricter immigration controls. 7 This struggle has become more acute over the past
fifteen years in many refugee-receiving nations, the product of a general anti-immigrant sentiment exacerbated by security concerns stemming from the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States,
the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, and the July 2005 London
Underground bombings.8 This conflict has been particularly acute in
the United Kingdom, as a result of policies initially implemented by the
Labor Government of then-Prime Minister Tony Blair to severely limit
the number of persons seeking, and ultimately being granted, asylum. 9
These policies have included making it more difficult for potential asyA.C. 147 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); S.C. Res. 955, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov
8, 1994); S.C. Res. 827, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
2 SeeJames N. Rosenau, Governance, Order and Change in World Politics, in GOVERNANCE
WI IHOUT GOVFRNMEN 1: ORI)ER AND CHANGE IN WORLI) IOLITICS 1, 4 (James N. Rosenau
& Ernst-Otto Czempiel eds., 1992).
3 See Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold, State Transformation, Globalization, and the Possibilities of Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE ILAWYERING AN)

I HE SIATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 3, 5-12

(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001).
4 See, e.g., Richard Maiman, Asylum Law Practice in the United Kingdom After the Human
Rights Act, in THE WORLIDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: SIRUtI URE ANt AGENCY IN LEGAL
IRACI tit 410, 411-13 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005) (discussing the evolution of asylum law in the United Kingdom and noting its incompatibility with portions of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
5 See generally Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
6 Id. arts. 35-36.
7 See Vincent Chetail, Freedom of Movement and TransnationalMigrations:A Human Rights

Perspective, in MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS 47, 47 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Vincent Chetail eds., 2003) ("[C]ontrol over migration remains one of the last
bastions of the truly sovereign state.").
8 See James Hampshire, Immigration Policy in the United Kingdom, MIGRATION CITIZENSHIP EDUC., http://www.migrationeducation.org/49.0.html (last visited May 9, 2013).
9See Maiman, supra note 4, at 412-14.
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hin-seekers to reach British territory in the first place, deporting insuccessful applicants more expeditiously, and cutting legal aid fimding
that had previously supported the work of refuigee lawyers. 10
This Article explores the ways that lawyers representing asylumseekers in the United Kingdom navigate the space between a diminished yet still formidable state authority over refugee status and the
continuing emergence of international norms that pose a threat to
such authority. The United Kingdom is a fascinating site to explore this
question because, by effectively incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 11 into its domestic law in 1998,12 and
agreeing to asylum procedures common to all European countries
through the European Union (EU) Qualification Directive of 2004,13
the United Kingdom consciously ceded significant control over refugee
determinations to international noris.14 Moreover, in 2011 the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom relied on the Convention on the
Rights of the Child 15 (which has not been formally incorporated into
British law) in holding that the best interests of the child must be a
primary concern in any deportation case that might result in the separation of a child from his or her parents.16
These legislative and judicial developments have allowed U.K_ refigee lawyers to simultaneously invoke international human rights norms
while remaining within the bounds of domestic precedent.17 As a result,
these lawyers play a critical role in shaping state power over refigee matters in the wake of globalization.1 8 By pushing for the expanded applica10See id.
n Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
12,See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 1 (U.K,).
13 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and
Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted,
2004 O.J. (L 304) 12.
14 Human Rights Act § 2.
15Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
CRC].
16ZH (Tanzania) v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKSC 4, [23]-[26] (appeal taken from Eng.). The decision in ZH (Tanzania) was based in part on section 55 of
the U.K, Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act of 2009, which provides in relevant
part that in relation to matters of immigration, asylum, or nationality, the Secretary of
State's duties must be "discharged [with] regard to the need to safeguard and promote the
welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom." Borders, Citizenship, and hmigration Act, 2009, c. 11, § 55 (U.t.).
17 Maiman, supra note 4, at 414-15.
18See id.
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tion of international hunan rights treaties to individual asylum cases,
refugee lawyers force judges to address the persuasiveness of these international arguments and, at least in some cases, accept them.19 Due
largely to such pressure, the role of international human rights norms
in U.K asylum adjudications has expanded significantly over the past
decade.20
This Article begins with a discussion of the two theoretical foundations that frame its analysis. It then outlines the empirical methodology
on which its findings are based. Next, it describes and analyzes the data,
and ends with a set of conclusions concerning the role of U.K, refugee
lawyers in the ongoing struggle over the proper role for international
huian rights norms in domestic law.
I.

THEORETICAL FRAMES

Two interrelated areas of socio-legal scholarship set the theoretical
frame for this Article: the diminution of state power in an era of globalization and cause lawyering in a global context. Each is described in
more detail below.
A. Diminution of State Power in an Era of Globalization
The rise of globalization has caused a realignment of norms guiding state conduct. 2' Competition between different legal standards has
intensified. 22 Typical spheres of power, predominantly state regulatory
regimes, have seen their influence decline. 23 The resulting power vacuim has been filled by a loose configuration of private-sector and international organizations, both profit-making and non-profit, operating
outside the confines of typical government regulation. 24 Power now
flows from foreign investment, liberal trade, and economic spheres
such as central banking systems. 25 This has caused state regulatory regimes to further deteriorate as economic growth is no longer within
26
their control.
19See id.
20 See id.
A Nw WoRL D ORDER 8-10 (2004).
22See Pheng Cheah, Posit(ion)ingHuman Rights in the Current Global Coojecture, 9 IuPB.
21 SeeANNE-MARIE SLAUGH I ER,

CULTURE 233, 252-53 (1997).
23 ,See SIAUGHTIFR, supranote 21, at 262.
24

Id.

25 David Goldblatt et al., Economic Globalization and the Nation-State: Shifting Balances of
Power 22 Ai, IERNAIIVtXS 269, 281 (1997).
26

Id
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The literature on globalization identifies numerous ways in which
states have ceded their policymaking powers to international economic
pressures. 27 For example, in an effort to promote economic stability
(and thereby to create more opportunity for trade and investment),
many states have taken steps to reduce social programs and thus reduce
taxes.28 Similarly, the rise of multinational corporations (MNCs) has led
to a focus on international economics causing a reduction of state policymaking powers. 29 MNCs are able to quickly shift labor and resources
to take advantage of favorable labor and investment conditions.30 States
surrender policymaking to MNCs in order to capitalize on their economic benefits. 3' Finally, the emergence of transnational regulatory
networks (TRNs), fora involving multiple nations' regulators, has further contributed to diminished policymaking powers of the state. 32 According to some scholars, TRNs are better equipped to deal with the
challenges of globalization because they are relatively unconstrained by
the political and jurisdictional pressures that constrict effective reform
at the state level. 33
This Article adds to the literature on globalization by arguing that
refugee lawyers in the United Kingdom wield significant influence in
the ongoing struggle between international human rights norms and
state power over migration. Unlike other areas of regulatory authority
where states have surrendered to global market forces for economic
benefit, the acceptance of international human rights norms by state
actors has been more contentious. 34 For example, while most countries
have ratified numerous human rights treaties, many states parties routinely ignore or actively violate them in practice.3 5 Moreover, while
some state actors (primarily within the judiciary) have embraced inter27 See SLAUGIITER, supra note 21, at 262; Maiman, supra note 4, at 414-15; Rosenau, supra note 2, at 8-9.
28 See LINDA WEISS, TILE MYTII OF TIE POWERLESS S I AT 190, 192 (1998).
29 See Goldblatt et al., supra note 25, at 277-80.
30 David Held, Rethinking Democracy: Globalization and Democratic Theory, in INTERNA-

59, 66 (Wolfgang Streeck ed., 1998).
-1See id.
32 Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J.
INT'L L. 113, 118-19 (2009). TRNs are "informal multilateral forums that bring together
representatives from national regulatory agencies or departments to facilitate multilateral
cooperation on issues of mutual interest within the authority of the participants." Id. at 118.
33 SLAUGIITER, supra note 21, at 167. Others see fewer benefits to TRNs. See Verdier, supra note 32, at 128-29.
TIONALE WIRTSCIIAFT, NATIONALE DEMOKRATIE

34 See BiTH A. SIMMONS,

MOBILIZING POR HUMAN RIGITS: INTERNATIONAL

LAW IN

273 (2009); Oona Hathaway, The Promise and Limits of the International
Law of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 199, 202-03 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
35 SIMMONS, supra note 34, at 273; Hathaway, supra note 34, at 202-03.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
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national human rights norms in determining eligibility for refugee status, 36 others (primarily within the legislative and executive branches)
37
have adopted measures to lessen the impact of such determinations.
The ongoing struggle between these forces has created all opening for
refigee lawyers to push for increased acceptance of international human rights norms in asyluni adjudications. 38 As a result, these norms
have significantly modified state power over migration in the United
Kingdom during the past decade. 39
B. Cause Lawyering in an Era of Globalization
Cause lawyering scholarship examines lawyers who consciously
seek social or political goals while simultaneously pursuing the interests
of their individual clients. 40 While much of this scholarship focuses on
cause lawyering in a comparative context (i.e., studying cause lawyering
sites in various countries and regions, and the ways in which cause lawyers both serve and respond to the forces of globalization),41 little of it
42
deals with the application of international norms in domestic courts.
This Article begins to fill that gap by focusing on ways that U.K. refugee
lawyers utilize international human rights norms when advocating on
behalf of their clients in an era when many U.K governmental policies
seek to restrict the rights of non-citizens.
One of the core tenets of cause lawyering literature is that such
lawyering thrives when a "confident" government promotes social justice initiatives, but is frustrated when a "frightened" government struggles to retain power. 43 This Article refines the latter of these premises in
the international human rights context, demonstrating that after over a
decade of what many would term drastic measures by the U.K. government to reassert power over its national borders, U.K cause lawyers
practicing refigee law are, if not thriving, certainly finding success in
36 See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [24].
37 See Maiman, supra note 4, at 411-13.

38See id.
39See id. at 416-20.
40 STUART A. SCIIEINGOLD &

AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS,

PROFFESSIONAL ISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING

3 (2005).

Sarat & Scheingold, supranote 3, at 13-14.
42 But see Maiman, supra note 4, at 410-24 (studying U.tK refugee lawyers shortly after
implementation of the Human Rights Act, which incorporated the ECHR into British domestic law).
43 Richard Abel, Speaking Truth to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in CAUSE LAWYERIN(: POLITICAI COMMITMEN IS AND PROIESSIONA1, RESPONSIBIIA iIs
69, 103 (Austin
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998).
41
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expanding the protections available to their clients. These findings
suggest that a modification of the tenet is warranted when a state's constricting domestic measures are countered by cause lawyers' innovative
and persistent use of international norms to which the state has agreed,
at least in principle, to abide. The state can surely frustrate the efforts
of cause lawyers by clamping down on internal forces seeking social
change, but when those forces are global norms which the state has
agreed to uphold, it is more difficult for the state to consistently resist
the efforts of cause lawyers to enforce them.
II. METHODOLOGY

The data collected for this Article was obtained through interviews
with forty-two U.K. solicitors and barristers between September 2010
and May 2013. All interviewees are lawyers who have regularly represented asylum-seekers and/or the government in asylum cases for at
least three years. Key informants helped identify lawyers who fit these
criteria for interviewing.
This qualitative approach seeks to understand the influence and
effectiveness of international human rights law from the lawyers' own
points of view, in their full complexity rather than in their distributional
frequency. The method is therefore inductive and consists of semistructured interviews with open-ended questions that focus on a set of
key themes: whether the lawyers regularly invoke international human
rights treaties in their asylum practice, under what circumstances they
do so, and whether they feel that such law has an impact-be it positive
or negative-on the outcomes of their cases. Because the study examines the key perceptions of cause lawyers about the impact of international human rights law on refigee law and practice in domestic courts,
interviewing at least forty-two lawyers in the United Kingdom is sufficient to reach thematic saturation: the point at which no new themes
44
emerge.
The interviews proceeded as follows: Each lawyer was first asked to
describe, in general terms, a recent asylum case that he or she argued
in front of an administrative tribunal or appellate court. Depending on
the depth of the response, the lawyer was asked follow-up questions regarding the particular facts of the case and the nature of the key legal
arguments made to the judge. If the lawyer mentioned an international
human rights treaty spontaneously during the initial response, they
44 Greg Guest et al., How Mauy Interviews Are Enough?: An Experiment with Data Saturation and lariability,18 Firiu) ME IIHO)S 59, 64-65 (2006).
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were asked how and why they used it in that case and whether they
thought it had any impact on the result-and if so, why. The lawyers
were then asked more general questions about the frequency with
which they explicitly reference international human rights law in their
advocacy. If a lawyer failed to mention any international human rights
treaty during the initial response, he or she was asked whether such
treaties cane up in the course of a case, and why or why not. Lawyers
were also asked the more general question of how frequently they explicitly refer to human rights law in asylum cases.
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE

U.K. ASYLUM

ADJUDICATION PROCESS

The United Kingdom is a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 45 (Refugee Convention) and thus is obligated to grant refugee status to those who can demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 46 The decision
whether to grant asylum in the United Kingdom is a hybrid administrative and judicial process. 47 An initial determination is made by the U.K.
Border Agency (Border Agency), which is part of the Home Office, a
governmental department focused on immigration, counterterrorism,
drugs, and crime. 4S If the claim is rejected by the Border Agency, the
claimant may appeal the denial to the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal (Tribunal), an administrative body that makes its own findings of

45 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, pmbl. n.1.
46 Id. art. 1; see Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606

U.N.T.S. 267 (removing the effect of the time limitation on the definition of "refugee" in
Article 1 of the 1951 Convention); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNI I E)
NA I ONS TinA IV COLLC I ION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src-TREATY

&mtdsgno-V-5&chapter-5&lang-en (last visited May 9, 2013) (showing the United Kingdom as a party to the 1967 Protocol).
47 There are three different claims an asylum-seeker can make in attempting to remain
in the United Kingdom: an asylum claim tunder the Refugee Convention, a claim for humanitarian protection under complementary protection principles that fall outside the
Refugee Convention, and a "human rights claim" under the ECHR/Human Rights Act.
Maria O'Sullivan, The Inteaection Between the Intertiational,the Regional and the Domestic: SeekingAsylum in the UK., in RE UGE S, AsyiUM SEEKERS AND I HE Rui, OF LAW 228, 251 (Susan Kneebone ed., 2009); seeJANE McAIAM, COMPLEMENIARY PROTECTION IN INIERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAw 1-2 (2007). As a practical matte; in each individual case, the Home

Office considers all three of these bases for protection, regardless of which one(s) the
claimant actually raises. O'Sullivan, supra, at 251. Therefore, for purposes of this Article, all
three of these claims will be designated as claims for asylum.
48 The Asylum Process, UK B oRIER AGENCY, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.go.uk/asylum/
process/ (last visited May 9, 2013).
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fact. 49 The Tribunal, comprised of approximately seven hundred judges, is divided into two levels: the First Tier initially hears the appeal and
its decision can be appealed to the Upper Tribunal. 5" If claimants are
unsuccessful at the Tribunal level, they may appeal to the Court of Appeal, and ultimately to the Supreme Court. 5' Judicial review is not a
right, and appeals beyond the Tribunal (that is, to the court) are limited to errors of law.52

IV.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
IN

U.K

ASYLUM ADJUDICATION

Prior to 2000, the only international human rights instrument relevant to asylum jurisprudence was the Reflgee Convention, which established the right to seek asylum. 53 The United Kingdom ratified the
Refugee Convention in 1954 but did not incorporate it into domestic
law until 1993. 54 The Refugee Convention limits asylum to those who
can demonstrate that if they are forced to return to their home country
they will be persecuted on the basis of one of the five Convention
grounds enumerated above. 55 Accordingly, the Refugee Convention

49 ROBERT TIOMAS, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND ASYLUM APPEALS: A STUDY OF TRI11NAL ADJLICA I ION 61-62 (2011); O'Sullivan, supra note 47, at
50 MARK SYMIS & PE IIERJORRO, ASYLUM LAW ANt) PRAC icr

252-53.
875 (2010); Robert Tho-

mas, Refugee Roulette: A UK Perspective, in REFUGEE ROULETTE 164, 164-65 (Jaya RamjiNogales et al. eds., 2009). While Tribunal judges-who are sometimes practicing refugee
lawyers-are required to issue written decisions, the Upper Tribunal only publishes those
decisions which it deems to have value as legal precedent or in describing conditions within a country relevant to the issue of whether an asylum-seeker's forced return would violate the United Kingdom's obligations under international law. SyMIS &JORRO, supra, at
1078-80. Although precise statistics are unavailable, one lawyer estimated that ten percent
of Tribunal decisions are published. Interview with Interviewee UK-106, in London, Eng.
(Sep. 10, 2012).
51 SYMES & JoRio, supra note 50, at 1112-14; Chapter 27 -Judicial Review, UK BORDER
ActNC Y, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.govuk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/IDIs/
idischapter27/ (last updated Apr. 25, 2013) (follow "Section 3 -Judicial review process" hyper
link; then scroll down to pages 2-3 of the linked document).
52 See generally SyMtES & JORRO, supra note 50, at 1035-1112 (discussing eligibility for
and procedure of appeal beyond the Tribunal).
53 See Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
54 See Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, c. 23, § 2 (U.I). According to section 2 of the Act, which is entitled "Primacy of Convention," "[n]othing in the immigration rules ... shall lay down any practice which would be contrary to the [Refugee] Convention." See id. Moreover, in section 1 of the Act, "claim for asylum" is defined as "a claim
made by a person ... that it would be contrary to the United Kingdom's obligations under
the [Refugee] Convention for him to be removed from, or required to leave, the United
Kingdom." Id. § 1.
55 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1 (A) (2).
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does not protect those likely to stiffer harm for other reasons, such as
generalized violence throughout their home country. 56 It also does not
protect children likely to be harmed if their parents are deported fol57
lowing an unsuccessfil asylum claim.
As a result of these limitations, lawyers representing refigees in the
58
United Kingdom prior to 2000 faced a significant challenge. Without
a bill of rights or similar document within domestic law, and facing judicial reluctance to rely on any international law other than the Refigee Convention, their advocacy options were extremely limited. 59 As
one lawyer practicing in this area for over a decade stated: "If you had
gone to an immigration tribunal pre-2000 and tried to bring tip the
[ECHR], they would have looked at you like you were wasting their
time." 60 Another lawyer explained that before the ECHR became part
of U.K. domestic law, judges relied exclusively on the common law in
deciding asylum claims. "[T] here were two schools of thought [both of
which] felt that our common law was capable of delivering the same
principles without tying us down to a particular treaty."6'
All of that changed in 2000, when the Human Rights Act (HRA)
became effective in England. 62 The HRA effectively incorporated the
ECHR, 63 which the United Kingdom had ratified in 1951, but had not
previously incorporated into domestic law.64 The HRA gave judges
something they had previously lacked in a legal system without a constitutional provision for judicial review: the ability to overrule human
rights-related decisions by the legislative and executive branches of
government. 65 It also provided practitioners with a broader basis for
56 See id.
57See SYMES & JORRO, supra note 50, at 432-33.
58 See O'Sullivan, supra note 47, 236-39 (characterizing the legislation proliferated by
the United Kingdom from 1993-2002 as obscure, complex, and technical).
59See Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50; Interview with Interviewee UK105, in London, Eng. (Sep. 10, 2012).
60Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50.
61 Interview with interviewee UK-105, supra note 59.
62 The HRA was enacted in 1998 and went into effect in Scotland in July 1999, and
Wales and England in October 2000. Maiman, supra note 4, at 410.
63 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42. The "Introductory Text" of the HRA states, in
relevant part, that it is "[a]n Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed
under the [ECHR]." Id. Section 3(1) of the HRA provides that "[s]o far as it is possible to
do so ...legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with
[ECHR] rights." d. § 3(1). Section 6(1) of the HRA provides that "[i]t
is unlawful for a
public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a[n] [ECHR] right[] ." d.
§ 6(1). Schedule 1 of the HRA consists of the operative provisions of the ECHR. Id. sch.1.
64 See id. § 1.
65Maiman, supra note 4, at 411.
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affording their clients protection. 66 While a particular applicant might
not be able to establish persecution on one of the grounds enumerated
in the Refugee Convention, if the applicant could show a likelihood of
ill treatment upon returning to his or her home country for other reasons, the applicant would be likely to receive protection under the
67
ECHR, and thus the HRA.
While neither the HRA nor the ECHR concern asylum or refugee
matters per se, lawyers representing asylum-seekers have invoked several ECHR provisions in defense of their clients. 68 For example, Article
3 of the ECHR prohibits, without exception, torture and "inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."69 Accordingly, Article 3 is relevant to most asylum claims, as the majority of asylum applicants assert
that they will be physically harmed if forced to return to their home
country. 70 Article 8 provides for the right to respect for one's private
and family life, home, and correspondence. 7' It is often invoked in cases where return to the applicant's country of origin will disrupt the private and/or family life developed since arriving in the United Kingdom. 7 2 These provisions, as well as others within the ECHR, offer
broader protection to asylum-seekers than does the Refugee Convention, which requires significant evidence of projected harm in a narrow
range of situations. 73 Moreover, the Refugee Convention also requires a
demonstration that the harm likely to be suffered is because of one of
the five enumerated reasons. 74 The ECHR's protections contain no
75
such requirement.
As a result, it has now become accepted, if not required, practice
for U.K refugee lawyers to invoke the ECHR. 76 Statements from lawyers interviewed for this Article support this notion. One, for example,
said:

id. at 416-17.
id.
68 5ee Interview with Interviewee UK-108,in London, Eng. (Sep. 17, 2012).
69 ECHR, supra note 11, art. 3.
70See, e.g.,
Maiman, supra note 4, at 417 (describing application of the ECHR and the
HRA to allegations of physical abuse).
71ECHR, supra note 11, art. 8.
72See Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68.
73
5ee ECHR, supranote 11, arts. 3, 8; Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
74Refuigee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1.
75See generally ECHR, supra note 11 (containing no enumeration of causes of harm).
76
5ee Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50; Interview with Interviewee UK108, supra note 68.
66 See
67 See
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I would never not run [the ECHR] .... [Y] ou don't have to
prove the particular Refugee Convention grounds .... [I] t is
incredibly rare to run a case without raising Article 8 as well.
Article 8 ECHR is sort of par for the course. You always run a
private life claim if they've been here for anything above a
year. 77
Another agreed, saying, "I can hardly think of any ... asylum case I've
done where I haven't relied on the Refugee Convention and the
[ECHR]. It's just absolutely standard. That's what your arguments are
about. "78
Indeed, most of the lawyers interviewed suggested that it might
border on malpractice to not invoke the ECHR in a particular case.79
They indicated that judges expect to hear such arguments, any former
resistance to them having been erased by the fact that the ECHR is "en80
shrined" in U.K. domestic law through the HRA.
These attitudes reflect a dramatic, and very recent, change in attitudes among lawyers about the acceptance of ECHR-based arguments.
For example, a 2005 study of the attitudes of U.K. refugee lawyers noted that "asylum lawyers were struggling to use the HRA ... to improve
their clients' prospects."S Furthermore, as recently as 2010, one of the
lawyers interviewed said that judges see HRA-based arguments as a sign
of desperation.8 2 More current interviews, however, suggest that the
EHCR has now become the kind of precedential statutory authority on
83
which the British judiciary depends.
V.

EFFORTS To REASSERT STATE AUTHORITY OVER
THE ASYLUM PROCESS

At the same time that the U.K. judiciary was beginning to accept
international norms beyond the Refugee Convention in evaluating asylum claims, the other branches of government were adopting procedures to limit the number of asylum-seekers and refugees within U.K.
borders.8 4 The catalyst for these procedures was the alleged abuse of
77 Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68.
78 Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50.

79 See id.
80 Id.
SI Mairnan, supra note 4, at 422.

Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-104 (Sep. 16, 2010).
83 See Interview with Interviewee UK-106, supra note 50; Interview with Interviewee UK82

108, supra note 68.
84 See O'Sullivan, supra note 47, at 233-34.
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the asylum system by migrants perceived as seeking economic prosperity rather than relief from persecution. 85 This perceived abuse became
a hot-button political issue in the late 1990s, seized upon by the tabloid
media as well as opposition politicians. 86 While toned down somewhat
in recent years, it has led to a culture of skepticism toward asylumseekers among the public and the judiciary. As one lawyer described
the situation: "The political ... background is absolutely rabid ....Asylum-seeker and refugee has become a dirty word. It is absolutely awful
and shocking ... [T]he counterargument is that there is abuse. Well,
there is abuse in every single system where we have a presumption of
innocence. ,87

As a result of public outcry against alleged abuse, and an attempt
to fend off charges from the Conservative Party and the media that it
was "soft" on asylum, the newly installed Labour government of Tony
Blair pledged to drastically reduce the number of asylum-seekers, culminating in the 2005 "tipping the balance target" proposal that it would
remove more asylum applicants per month than the number who apply.88 These efforts were aided by the United Kingdom's enforcement
of the Dublin Convention of 1990, which permits any EU Member
State to transfer an asylum applicant to the EU Member State where
the applicant first entered without documentations 9 As a result, the
deportation of asylum-seekers as a percentage of all removed immigrants in the United Kingdom rose from 6.4% in 1993 to 25.6% in
2006.90 The government also made life more difficult for those asylumseekers who were not removed by dispersing them throughout the
country and limiting their eligibility for welfare benefits. 91
In addition to removing asylum-seekers already in the country, the
government adopted a number of policies during the first decade of the
95 See

id. at 233 n.29.

83 Id.

87Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-111 (Oct. 18, 2012).
88 Matthew Gibney, Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom, 43
Gov'I & OPPOSI IION 146, 157 (2008).
89 SYMIS & JORRO, supra note 50, at 475-76. Given that many asylum-seekers in the
United Kingdom first entered the EU through another country (typically in southern or
eastern Europe), the United Kingdom was able to remove many asylum-seekers without
adjudicating their claims. See id. at 476-78.
9o See SCOTT BLINDER, TIIE MIGRATION OBSERVATORY AT TIE UNIV. OF OXFORr, BRIEF
IHE UK 5-6 figs.2 & 3
(2012), available at http://www.migrationobserv atory.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/migobs/BriefingDeportations.pdf (calculated fiom graphs noting the number total deportations and depor
tations by subtype).
91Gibney, supra note 88, at 157.
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twenty-first century making it more difficult for asylum-seekers to reach
the United Kingdom in the first place. 92 These policies included tighter
control over documents, increased scrutiny of persons attempting to
travel to the United Kingdom via air and rail, increased fines for airlines
and truck drivers who transport undocumented persons to the country,
and reduction of available points of entry.93 Like the concerted effort to
remove asylum applicants, these measures had their intended impact:
the number of asylum applicants in the United Kingdom fell by over
94
fifty percent between 2002 and 2010, from 103,000 to 41,000.
The U.K, government has also made it more difficult to obtain
refugee status by frequently changing the rules governing the asylum
process. 95 As a result, a series of legislative initiatives over the past decade have resulted in restricted appeal rights and other procedural barriers to effective asylum claims. 96 Most recently, in July 2012, the Home
Secretary proposed restrictive changes to the rules governing adjudica97
tion of cases under ECHR Article 8.
The final and perhaps most significant governmental measure
making asylum less attainable are cutbacks in legal aid funding. The
legal aid system in the United Kingdom began in 1949 and provides
legal services to lower-income persons in a variety of areas, including
immigration law. 9s Approximately thirty percent of all adults in the
United Kingdom qualify for legal aid. 99 Most lawyers who provide legal
services to immigrants, including asylum-seekers, receive some form of

92 See, e.g., Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act, 2004, c. 19,
17 (U.K.); Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act, 2002, c. 41 (U.K.); Immigration
and Asylum Act, 1999, c. 33, §§ 18, 32 (U.K.).
93 See Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act § 17; Immigration
and Asylum Act §§ 18, 32.

§

94 Compare UNIEI

NAIONS H IGH COMM'R ON REP UGEES, SIATISI ICAL YEARBOOK

at 88 tbl.9 (2011), available at http://www.unhcrnorg/4ef9c7269.html, with UNI

IE)

2010,

NAFIIONS

HIGH COMM'R ON REIUGEES, SIATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2002 annex tbls.C.1, C.7 (2004), avail-

able at http://www.unhcr.org/413598454.html.
95 See O'Sullivan, supra note 47, at 236-39.
96 Id. at 237-38.
97 See HOME DIEPARIMIENT,

SIATEMENT

OF CHANGES

IN IMMIGRATION RULES,

2012,

H.C. 194 passim (U.K.). The proposed changes require Tribunal judges to balance a claimant's assertion of family rights under Article 8 with considerations that include the claimant's criminal history and whether there are any insurmountable obstacles to the continuation of the claimant's family life outside the United Kingdom. Id. at 4. The rules were
challenged with mixed success in a recent ltpper Tribunal case. See MF (Nigeria) v. Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't, [2012] UKUT 00393 (IAC).
98
jon Robins, LegalAid in 21st-Century Britain, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/money/2009/mar/11/legal-aid-justice-gap.
99 See id.
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financial remuneration from legal aid. 100 As numerous scholars have
noted, asylum-seekers generally have a much better chance of success
when they are represented by counsel. 1uAccording to one lawyer interviewed for this Article: "One thing is absolutely right.., that the way
our ... asylum determination system is set up is contingent upon appli02
cants having good quality legal advice and representation."'
The Cameron government, in its efforts to reduce budget deficits,
has taken steps to substantially cut legal aid. 103 A previous round of cuts
to the reimbursement rate and increased delay in the distribution of
reimbursements to lawyers contributed to the closing of Refugee and
Migrant Justice, and the Immigration Advisory Service, two prominent
organizations that provided legal assistance to large numbers of refiigees and other immigrants. 0 4 The latest round of cuts, implemented in
April 2013, completely eliminate legal aid funding for a variety of immigration-related matters, including applications to remain in the United
Kingdom under Article 8 of the ECHR. 05 And while funding will still be
available for asylum-seekers, the reimbursement rate for such work will
06
be further reduced.
Lawyers in the interview sample (including those who represent
the government) have described the cuts as "drastic," "devastating,"
and likely to have an "enormous" impact on persons seeking refuge

100 Owen Bowcott, Tens of Thousands Lose Support as Immigmtion Adviso(f Service Closes,
(July 11, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/jul/11/immigration-advis
ory-service-closes-blames-government; Migrant Charity in Administrationi Amid Cash Pmoblems,
BBC NEws (June 15, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10324774.
101Although there have been no empirical studies in the United Kingdom of the correlation between representation by counsel and successful asylum claims, a significant
correlation between those factors has been identified in both the United States and Canada. Sean Rehaag, The Role of Counsel in Canada'sRefugee Determination System: An Empirical
Assessment, 49 Oscoomi HALL L.J. 71-116 (2011); seeJon B. Gould et al., A Refugee from
Justice?DisparateTreatment in theFederal Court of Canada, 32 LAW & Poi, 454, 457-58 (2010);
Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Immigration Courts, in REFUcE ROULI E,supra note 50, at 33,
45.
102 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-101 (Sep. 8, 2010).
103 Cf. Memorandum from Steve Symonds, Legal Officer, Immigr. L. Prac. Ass'n, Updates
to Cuts/Changes to Legal Aid for Immigration Advice (May 15, 2012), available at http://
www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resoturces/14725/12.17.05-Ealing-Ad-vice-Forurm-re-Legal-Aid.pdf
(detailing reduced legal aid services for immigration and asylum issues).
104 See Bowcott, supra note 100; Migrant Charity in AdministrationAmid Cash Problems, supra note 100.
105See Memorandum from Steve Symonds, supra note 103; see also Patrick Hennessy, Legal
Aid Curb for Foreign Migrants, Tri f GRAPH (London), Apr. 6, 2013, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/politics/9976786/Legal-aid-curb-for-foreign-migrants.html.
106See Memorandum from Steve Symonds, supra note 103.
GUARDIAN
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from persecution. 10 7 Interviewees cited several reasons for these grim
assessments. The most common response was that the cuts will reduce
the number of lawyers representing asylum-seekers because most lawyers currently doing so offer additional advice to immigrants that will
no longer be funded through legal aid.108 As a result, many of these
lawyers are likely to leave the immigration field entirely. As one lawyer
succinctly put it: "We're all very worried that the good [solicitor] firms
09
... will go uinder ....There's only so much pro bono you can do.'
Another consistently-cited concern was that people with otherwise
valid claims under Article 8 will be returned to their home countries."10
As one lawyer put it: "I'm sure that every day dozens of people will be
removed from the United Kingdom who, were their [Article 8] case
dealt with properly, would have succeeded in demonstrating that it was
not proportionate to remove them. '
In addition to these oft-cited effects, a few lawyers articulated other, less obvious impacts that demonstrate the logical inconsistency of
the government's proposals. For example, at a time when the government is otherwise trying to reduce the number of asylum claims in the
United Kingdom, the cuts will likely increase the number of asylum
claims because seeking asylum will be one of the only governmentfunded ways to seek to remain in the country." 2 The consequences of
this development are significant, and go beyond an obviously increased
judicial caseload. 113 Many of the litigants in these cases will be unrepresented, putting even greater pressure on limited judicial resources. 114
Moreover, lawyers predict that many of these cases are likely to be of
questionable merit, which will heighten public hostility toward refigees
generally. 115 As one lawyer put it, the "panic" over asylum-seekers will
107 Interview with Interviewee UK-114, in London, Eng. (Nov. 22, 2012); Telephone
Interview with Interviewee UK-113 (Nox. 9, 2012); Interview with Interviewee UK-108,
supra note 68.
108See Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with
Interviewee UK-113, supra note 107; Interview with Interviewee UK-120, in London, Eng.
(No,. 6,2012); Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68.
109Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68.
110 See id.

"I Interview with Interviewee UK-115, in London, Eng. (No,. 2, 2012).
112 See Memorandum from Steve Symonds, supra note 103; Interview with Interviewee
UK-114, supra note 107.

See Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107.
114 ,See id.;
Interview with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108.
115 See Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107 (discussing how using Refugee Act claims as a way to get legal aid can pollute perceptions of the system); Interview
with Interviewee UK-118, in London, Eng. (Oct. 18, 2012) (noting that citing directly to
treaty provisions can be difficult).
113
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return. 116 Another lawyer indicated that the rise in such cases will impair the reputation of lawyers, who will be viewed as litigating baseless
claims. 117 Finally, one lawyer who frequently represents the state in asyhim cases felt that the impending changes will hurt government lawyers
because a lack of funding for most immigration-related matters will
mean that solicitors who later represent the government in refigee
cases will no longer acquire experience doing a range of immigration
work, making them less effective.lS
Viewed within the frame of globalization, the legal aid cuts are an
extremely effective means of reasserting state power over migration and
counteracting the encroachment of international norms. By limiting
immigrants' ability to obtain counsel in Article 8 proceedings, for example, the government diminishes lawyers' opportunities to pressure
courts to expand the influence of international human rights treaties
within U.K. jurisprudence. 119
VI. RESPONSE OF CAUSE LAWYERS TO THE REASSERTION OF STATE
POWER OVER ASYLUM

At the same time that the United Kingdom has taken the steps described above to make the right to asylum more difficult to assert and
asylum itself more difficult to obtain, refigee lawyers have sought to
increase their clients' likelihood of obtaining asylum by expanding the
application of international norms to individual asylum cases.120 They
have pursued two interrelated strategies in doing so: advocating for
complementary human rights protections for their clients and exploiting the increasingly global perspective of the U.K. judiciary. Each of
these strategies is discussed below.
A. Conplementary Human PghtsProtections
One of the strategies most consistently articulated by lawyers interviewed is infusing their advocacy with human rights arguments beyond
116See Interview with Interviewee UK-107, in London, Eng. (Sept. 7, 2012).
117Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107. Not all lawyers felt that the effect of the cuts would be uniformly adverse to asylum-seekers. One thought that the cuts
would weed out some of the less skilled laywers representing refugees. Interview with Interviewee UK-115, supra note 111. Another predicted that some of the more skilled lawyers
will become Tribunal judges, thus improving asylum jurisprudence overall. See Interview
with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108.
118 Interview with Interviewee UK-119, in London, Eng. (Nox. 2, 2012).
119 See Maiman, supra note 4, at 411-12.
120See ibfra text accompanying notes 129-165.
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the Refugee Convention and the ECHR. 121 These arguments fall under
the general rubric of complementary protection, which offers broader
protections than the Refugee Convention and, in some cases, the
ECHR. 22 Refuigee lawyers thus seek to expand the ways that their clients might be able to remain in the United Kingdom by arguing that
they are protected by treaties which the United Kingdom has ratified
but not formally incorporated into domestic law. The most frequently
mentioned treaty in this regard is the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), which obligates states parties to ensure that, in all actions
taken by public officials involving children, the best interests of the
child shall be a "primary consideration." 123 Moreover, the CRC requires
states parties to ensure that children are not separated from their parents against their will. 124 Accordingly, the CRC offers broader protections to asylum-seekers than either the Refugee Convention or the
ECHR. 125 The CRC also offers flrther protections by recognizing the
social and economic rights of children and the right of children to participate in judicial proceedings, both of which are absent from the Ref126
ugee Convention and the ECHR.
121

See Interview with Interviewee UK-118, supra note 115; Interview with Interviewee

UK-106, supra note 50; Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-101, supra note 102; Interview with Interviewee UK-107, supra note 116.
122 See McADAM, supra note 47, at 1-2.
123 CRC, supra note 15, art. 3(1) ("In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.").
124 Id. art. 9(1) ("States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his
or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation
is necessary for the best interests of the child.").
125 MCADAM, supra note 47, at 173-74. The CRC has received judicial imprimatur in
several countries, including Denmark, Finland, Canada, Australia, and the United States.
See id. at 183-94; Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, UnaccompaniedRefugee Minors: The Role and Place of
InternationalLaw in the PuTsuit ofDurable Solutions, 3 IN i'lJ. CH II)REN'S Ris. 405, 405-06
(1995).
126 CRC, supra note 15, art. 4 ('With regard to economic, social and cultural rights, States
Parties shall undertake [implementing] measures to the maximum extent of their available
resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation."). Article
12 of the CRC states, in full:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting
the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with
the age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the
child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a
manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
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There is a concerted effort among many U.K. refugee lawyers to
bring cases under the CRC in order to give meaning to the term "best
interests of the child."' 27 One of the most frequently articulated such
arguments is that the deportation of the parent of a U.K.-based child
will violate the United Kingdom's obligations under the CRC, even
where the parent does not have a valid asylum claim.1 28 Another more
nascent argument is that the CRC protects the public rights of children-not simply their private rights-and thus would prevent them
from being returned to a country where generalized violence prevails,
29
even if the child has not been individually targeted for persecution. 1
Lawyers' efforts to incorporate the CRC into their advocacy received a huge boost with the 2011 decision in ZH (Tanzania) v.Secretary
of State for the Home Department, 130 in which the U.K. Supreme Court cited to the CRC when holding that courts must consider the best interests of the child in cases involving removal of non-citizens (including
those concerning asylum applicants).131 This Supreme Court imprimatur on the CRC has been critical to the U.K. judiciary's acceptance of
human rights treaties beyond the Refugee Convention and the
ECHR. 13 2 As one lawyer put it, "[ZH (Tanzania)] really blew open the
jurisprudence on the rights of the child, the best interests of the
child."' 133 Another lawyer echoed this sentiment: "The [CRC] is very
important... courts have taken judicial notice of it, but it also becomes
a hardened legal standard by being incorporated into interpretation of
4
Article 8.'1
One indicator of the importance of ZH (Tanzania) in reasserting
the importance of international norms in asylum adjudication is the
statement of a refugee lawyer who was interviewed for this Article in
Id. art. 12.
127 See

ZH (Tanzania) x. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKSC 4, [5]-[13]

(appeal taken from Eng.) (noting explicitly appellant's reliance on CRC and the question
of what is in the child's best interest).
128
See id. at [11]-[13].
129Interview with Interviewee UK-105, supranote 59.
130See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [23].
131As noted above, in addition to the CRC, the decision in ZH (Tanzania) was based on
section 55 of the U.K. Borders, Citizenship, and Immigration Act of 2009, which requires
the Secretary of State's duties to be discharged in ways that safeguard and promote the
welfare of children in the United Kingdom. See supra note 16. ZH (Tanzania) was the first
case where section 55 (as well as the CRC) received such judicial imprimatur. See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [24].
132See Interview with Interviewee UK-107, supranote 116.
133Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supranote 68.
134Interview with Interviewee UK-107, supranote 116.
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2010, prior to the decision in ZH (Tanzania). This lawyer noted the irony of the way that the adoption of the ECHR, through passage of the
HRA, had subsequently been counterbalanced by a reduction in complementary protection through other international human rights instrunents:
Oddly, at the same time as the Human Rights Act started to
... bite, you end up getting less complementary protection
granted because the government decides that they are worried about the numbers coming and tries to bear down on
protection standards as a result .... They couldn't go below
the human rights standards contained in the [Human Rights]
Act. But you've also seen a sort of diminution of complementary protection based on discretion, based on compassion,
135
based on other humanitarian ideals and objectives.
ZU (Tanzania) has, for the moment at least, steiied this diminution of
complementary protections. 136 Although it is still early to determine
with any certainty the long-term impact of ZU (Tanzania) on asylum jurisprudence, it has certainly aided lawyers' efforts to apply complementary international norms to domestic law in the United Kingdom. 137 As
a result, judges will be forced to at least address the issue of whetherand how-these norms apply in individual cases. 138 Whether they do so
39
in a way that generally aids asylum-seekers remains to be seen. 1
135Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-101, supra note 102.
136 Other lawyers recently interviewed for this Article indicated that they have used
other complementary protections in their advocacy, including the International Covenant
on CMl and Political Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107; Telephone Interview with Interviewee
UK-111, supra note 87. See generally Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,
Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. However, none of these treaties has obtained as much acceptance within the judiciary as the CRC.
137 In this way, the decision in ZH (Tanzania) is similar to that in Baker v. Minister of Citizeuiship and Immigration, which established a similar precedent in Canada. See [1999] 2 SCR
817, 860-62 (Can.). Since that opinion, Canadian refugee lawyers have frequently invoked
the CRC in their advocacy, even though Canada has not formally incorporated the treaty
into domestic law. See id. at 861; Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum Seekers?: Canadian Refugee JuTrisprudence and Practice Since 1990, at 11 (Minn. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 12-59, 2012), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract- 2164258.
138See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [24].
139Preliminary indications from the author's ongoing research of published U.K. asyhim decisions indicate that arguments based on the CRC are, indeed, gaining traction.
Based on a sample of fifty-eight reported decisions in the asylum tribunals and appellate
courts between 1990 and 2012 in which the CRC was referenced in some way, there were
no helpful references to the CRC (out of ten total references) prior to 2005, but twenty-
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ZH (Tanzania) was the result of a legal strategy long practiced by
cause lawyers in litigation: pushing the boundaries of precedent to establish revised standards that assist not only their clients, but a larger
cause. 140 In this case, that cause is the diffusion of international human
rights norms.141 Lawyers interviewed for this Article described this process in a variety of ways, in particular that of "educating" judges. For
example, one lawyer noted, "I suppose if practitioners aren't [articulating these laws] then we are not going to be able to educate the judiciary to take [the laws] into account.' ' 4 2 Another said, 'judges ...welcome being shown how the EU Charter [which includes the ECHR and
other human rights instruments] works and being taken kind of
through the history of it a bit .. it depends on the judge ....When
you are arguing something different you get the judge's attention.' ' 4 3 A
third said, "[You say to the judge] 'I am going to tell you where the
learning comes from [on that subject] .... .' It's all about giving the
judge comfort. If you want to do something quite interesting and crea' 44
tive, then you just give them comfort.'
This strategy is not without risks, as an educational session might
annoy a judge, particularly if she or he is not predisposed toward human
rights arguments.145 Indeed, some lawyers identified circumstances
where invoking treaty-based argument may actually hurt, rather than
help, an asylum applicant.146 For example, one attorney stated that lawyers who push such arguments at the Tribunal level, where-according
to this lawyer-the judges do not like complicated law, might end up
biasing the court against their client.147 Other lawyers noted, for example, that "[pleople feel they have to throw everything in ....I've sat at
the back of the courts lots of times and watched judges say 'what does
this add to your argument?' Why be put in that position?" 148 Another
two helpful references (out of forty-eight total references) between 2005 and the present.
For these purposes, "helpful" references occur when the CRC either (1) was the basis of a
grant of asylum or other form of relief from removal, or (2) buttressed a decision in favor
of the applicant that the court or tribunal reached on other grounds (such as the Refugee
Convention). Thus, the number of helpful references to the CRC has expanded considerably since 2005.
See SCIIEINGOLD & SARAT,supra note 40, at 13-14.
141 ,See id.at 14.
140

142Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-102 (Oct. 18, 2010).
143 Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK113, supra note 107.
144 Interview with Interviewee UK-114, supra note 107.
145 See Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supranote 68.
146 See Interview with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108.
147 Interview with Interviewee UK-108, supra note 68.
148 Interview with Interviewee UK-120, supra note 108.
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noted that such a move can be counterproductive "if it highlights the
lack of provision in the Convention that you could rely on directly. 149 A
third agreed, saying, "Ifyou try to rely on too many grounds, at times
50
you undermine one by making progress with another."'
These reactions suggest that invoking human-rights-based argument may not be the win-win situation many cause lawyers assume (i.e.,
that it will help both their clients and the larger cause of general acceptance of human rights norms applicable to asylum claims). In some
cases, it can both hurt the cause of human rights generally, as well as
the immediate interests of the client. 151
Such risks, however, have not deterred most U.K refugee lawyers
from pursuing a long-term strategy of pushing for greater understand52
ing and acceptance of complementary protections for asylum-seekers.1
Cases like ZH (Tanzania) prove the wisdom of this strategy and fiel similar efforts. 153 Litigation over such matters is likely to be at the forefront
of the struggle over the proper role of international norms in U.K asy54
lum jurisprudence and policy for the foreseeable future. 1
B. Playing to the GlobalJudicialStage
A related strategy for expanding the scope of international norms
in U.K. refugee law is exploiting the globalization of human rights jurisprudence. 55 As Anne-Marie Slaughter has noted, courts in many
countries often look to the human rights jurisprudence of other nations for guidance because they are relying on a core of international
agreements. 156 An attorney interviewed for this Article indicated that
U.K judges who rule on asylum cases are "aware that they make law for
the whole world.'1 57 Other lawyers welcomed this development, noting
that it has resulted in a more serious consideration of human rights
arguments in asylum jurisprudence. For example, one said: "My sense
is that the higher up you go the much more conscious the court is of its
international influence. And I think it is a good thing because it makes

Interview with Interviewee UK-118, supra note 115.
150 Interview with Interviewee UK-121, in London, Eng. (No,. 6, 2012).
151 ee Maiman, supra note 4, at 418.
152 See id. at 419-21.
153 See ZH (Tanzania), [2011] UKSC 4 at [12], [29]-[33]; Interview with Interviewee
149

UK-108, supra note 68.
154 See Maiman, supra note 4, at 414-15.

See SLAUGIITER, supra note 21, at 79-81.
Id.
157 Interview with Interviewee UK-107, supra note 116.
155

156
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the whole endeavor much more serious."' 58 Another noted: "[You tell
the judge] you are on the right side of global attitudes and global
thinking ....This is where the thinking globally is going .... [Judges]
like to think of themselves as being on the right side of global developinents. "159

These comments suggest yet another way that globalization has
eroded state authority over refugee matters. Judges deciding cases in
this area may be at least as beholden to international forces, including
jurists, lawyers, and scholars from other countries, as they are to state
actors within the country where they sit.160 Their international audience may create subtle pressures leading them to adopt a more international, rather than domestic, perspective when deciding asylum cases. 161 Many refugee lawyers are aware of this phenomenon and seek to
use it to their clients' advantage. 162
CONCLUSIONS

This Article's empirical findings advance the two areas of sociolegal scholarship which formed its framework.
A. Devolution of State Power via Globalization
As numerous scholars have observed, globalization has created a
power vacuum in many areas of civil society, including commerce,
trade, and finance. 63 On the other hand, despite the increased influence of international norms throughout the world, individual states
64
continue to assert significant power over immigration law and policy. 1
States maintain this power in two ways, which we might think of as bad
cop-good cop behavior. 165 In the role of bad cop, the state takes steps to
66
limit the number of asylum-seekers and refugees within its borders.1
In the United Kingdom, these steps have included increased penalties
for those who transport refugees into the country, ever-changing pro158Telephone Interview with Interviewee UK-111, supra note 87.

Interview with Interviewee UK114, supra note 107.
16o
See SLAUGITER, supra note 21, at 81.
159

161 See id.
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163See David Held & Anthony McGrew, Introduction, in (OVERNING (LOBALIZATION:
POWER, AUTHORIIY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 2-4 (David Held & Anthony McGrew
eds., 2002).
164See McAIAM, supra note 47, at 254-55.
165See id.; Gibney, supra note 88, at 159-61.
166 See Gibney, supra note 88, at 156.
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cedural rules that make it more difficult to meet the standard for asylum, and greatly reduced legal aid funding. 167 In the role of good cop,
the state adopts international human rights standards, thus broadening
the forms of protection available to refugees under domestic (rather
than international) law. 6s In the case of the United Kingdom, these
forms of adoption include effective incorporation of the ECHR into
domestic law through the HRA, transposition into U.K_ domestic law of
the EU Qualification Directive on uniform asylum procedures, passage
of section 55 of the U.K. Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act
2009, and the Supreme Court decision in ZH (Tanzania), which provided judicial imprimatur on the Convention on the Rights of the

Child. 169
Thus, rather than cede power to global forces-as is the case with
other areas of state policy described in the globalization literature-in
the migration context states either fight to retain power (the bad cop)
or co-opt it by adopting international norms (the good cop). This resuilts in mixed messages from different state actors, as they give with
one hand (incorporating the ECHR) and take away with the other (legal aid cuts).
Refugee lawyers have a strong influence on this process, particularly in encouraging courts to adopt international human rights standards into domestic law through judicial precedent. 170 For without such
influences it appears that many judges are likely to rely only on domestic interpretations of international law. 171 The advocacy of many U.K.
refuigee lawyers for complementary protection under unincorporated
treaties like the CRC, however, effectively forces judges to deal with international arguments and, at least in some cases-like ZH (Tanzania)accept them.172
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B. Cause Lawyering
This Article provides evidence justifying a slight modification to
one of the primary tenets of the cause lawyering literature, namely that
cause lawyering is frustrated under a "frightened government" which
resorts to restrictive measures to regain control. 173 It is fair to characterize the U.K government's response to increased immigration flows
over the past fifteen years as one of fear, i.e., fear of losing control of
the nation's borders. 174 However, this Article demonstrates that despite
the desperate measures taken by the government to curb the influx of
asylum-seekers, cause lawyers representing asylum-seekers are not completely frustrated in their attempts to provide protection for their clients. 175 Indeed, compared to a study of such lawyers less than a decade
76
ago, today's refugee lawyers are far more optimistic.1
This ray of hope for cause lawyers has been brought about by an
intriguing combination of domestic law and international human
rights norms, which have enabled lawyers to broaden the parameters of
asylum law protection beyond that which state law affords.177 Accordingly, one corollary to this core tenet of cause lawyering is that when
the forces against which state power is aligned are international in nature (e.g., international human rights norms), cause lawyering may not
flourish, but it certainly is not frustrated. 17S At least in the United Kingdom, cause lawyers use those norms to keep pushing the boundaries of
domestic resistance, confident-or at least hopeful-that they will
eventually experience breakthroughs like ZH (Tanzania).1 79 Suich breakthroughs take time, as the education of judges proceeds slowly, usually
through a series of preliminary cases which may be unsuccessful. 1so
Another modification to this fundamental principle is that the
government should not be seen as monolithic when it comes to being
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frightened.
In a tripartite government, one branch might be less
fearful than another, more open to social change, or less apprehensive
about public opinion. 8 2 To that extent, cause lawyers engaging with
the less fearful branch (the judiciary, in the United Kingdom) can
flourish, while those who engage with more fearful branches (the U.K
executive, and in particular the Home Office) will likely be frustrated. 183
In the final analysis, refugee lawyers in the United Kingdom are
not resisting state power over migration as much as trying to redefine
it; that is, they seek to modify the sources on which that power is
based.184 In the globalization context, they endeavor to fill the power
vacuum in the new global legal order by pressuring the state (through
its courts) to not only broaden human rights-based protections for refugees but to make those protections part of domestic law. 185 In this way,
cause lawyers are proponents of expanded state power over migration,
provided that power is based on international human rights norms. 186
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